BRUSSELS — Jordan Bardella was never meant to be his party’s presidential candidate.
The 30-year-old member of the European Parliament is the protégé of Marine Le Pen, the far-right leader of France’s National Rally. For years, the two complemented each other. Le Pen was the party’s face and standard-bearer; Bardella ran its operations, led its delegation in Brussels and waited for his mentor to win so he could become prime minister.
Le Pen’s 2025 conviction for embezzling EU funds changed everything, handing her a five-year ban from public office and propelling Bardella into the presidential fray. On July 7, an appeals court will decide whether to uphold the conviction — and, with it, which of the two will be the party’s candidate.
As the French far right’s possible standard-bearer, Bardella is being forced to clarify where he stands on defining issues: the party’s pivot toward economic moderation, its approach to the European Union and how he would manage France’s nuclear arsenal.
Bardella, long used to being grilled by the media, appeared unfazed as he discussed all this and more in an exclusive interview in POLITICO’s Brussels office ahead of a trip to Poland — the kind of high-profile visit once reserved for his mentor.
This conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
You’re quite selective about your international trips. You’ve been to the United Kingdom, Israel and the United Arab Emirates. Why did you choose Poland as your next stop?
Poland is a country that counts, and each day it counts a little more on the European stage. Poland is now the sixth-largest economy in the European Union, and on a number of issues in recent years, Poland has made a very clear commitment to protecting its borders in the face of migration flows that pose a significant challenge to European nations. Faced with the need to regain strategic autonomy, Poland has been making very clear efforts in terms of rearmament and defense.
I am scheduled to meet with leaders of the PiS to discuss and prepare for the Europe of tomorrow.
Do you see PiS, the Law and Justice Party, as natural partners if they win Poland’s general election next year?
Today, the PiS party sits in the European Parliament within the ECR group, which is also [Italian Prime Minister] Giorgia Meloni’s group, with whom we regularly work.
Our ambition is to think big and to build a new European architecture capable of addressing the major challenges of the 21st century — and we will certainly need the largest group possible.
Is this alliance already a done deal, then? Can there be two big dogs in the same group?
It’s not a done deal. The European Parliament involves complex balances. It’s driven both by alliances and ad-hoc coalitions but influenced by the people. Giorgia Meloni will be an indispensable partner for France if we win the next election.
You have also recently reached out to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, even though he is not from your political camp. Are these visits, your numerous references to Giorgia Meloni, a way of saying that if the National Rally comes to power, it’s not the end of the European Union?
We do not wish to leave the European Union. We wish to change everything without destroying anything.
For several years now — for a decade — we have been witnessing all over the world the return of everything the European Union has sought to deconstruct, dismantle and even destroy: the nation, borders, the defense of the national interest, the people in their fully sovereign capacity. We are seeing all these grand concepts, which also pertain to national pride, making a comeback across the major powers operating within globalization.
So we simply say that Europe must change the way it functions.
Do you still want to withdraw from NATO’s integrated command, and if so, when?
I am a French sovereigntist. I defend my country’s freedom. We are not in favor of leaving NATO. But we are in favor of leaving NATO’s integrated command to regain room for maneuver, to regain freedom and independence on diplomatic and military matters.
But as I have said, we do not wish to leave the integrated command as long as there is war at Europe’s doorstep.
Marine Le Pen recently said withdrawal during the next five-year presidential term, which isn’t exactly the same wording. Do you still hold that France should not withdraw before the end of the conflict?
One doesn’t redefine the framework of treaties in times of war.
Our priority — if tomorrow we win the presidency — will be to work, through new French leadership, to restore peace at Europe’s doorstep, first through a ceasefire in Ukraine and then to the establishment of security guarantees that would allow Ukraine to defend its borders.
Is Russian President Vladimir Putin a danger to France?
President Putin’s Russia is today a multidimensional threat to French interests and to European interests. But Russia is a nuclear power. France is a nuclear power. This reality gives us a unique responsibility in how we approach dialogue with powers that possess the ultimate weapon.
There was recently an update to France’s nuclear doctrine, and Poland is one of nine countries that have joined an advanced form of cooperation put forward by President Emmanuel Macron. Would a National Rally-led France be willing to launch a nuclear strike to come to the aid of allies such as Poland?
We adhere strictly to the philosophy and doctrine of [France’s former president General Charles] de Gaulle, who rightly reminded us that the defense of the French nation’s vital interests does not stop at France’s borders. He said that France’s vital interests are threatened from the moment the Benelux region itself is potentially in danger.
But we are extremely attached to national sovereignty in matters of defense, and therefore the nuclear launch button must remain exclusively in the hands of the French president.
Regarding deterrence — and this must be emphasized — before being nuclear, it is first and foremost conventional. We are bound by defense agreements with our European partners that include mutual assistance clauses, particularly within the framework of the European Union but also under Article 5 of NATO. And so, if a European Union country were to be attacked tomorrow, this would elicit a reaction from all the other European countries.
You would honor these commitments?
Yes, of course. But France must restore its defense capabilities, and that is why we support the NATO objectives to gradually increase defense budgets.
I want to show you this editorial from 1939 in a French newspaper called “Dying for Danzig?” The author argues that France shouldn’t die for the Polish city now known as Gdańsk. What do you think?
It’s extremely dangerous to draw parallels between that period of history and what we’re experiencing today. There’s no Nazi army. There’s no Third Reich today.
No, but there are parallels.
It’s extremely perilous to compare situations that, strictly speaking, have absolutely nothing in common. What is certain is that there are European interests today that are being challenged, a resurgence of Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe. Faced with this, the only viable and acceptable policy is to prevent France and European nations from transferring their defense sovereignty to the European Commission. I refuse to allow the European Commission to have the power to send French soldiers to die.
We have weaknesses that are very well documented and widely recognized: long-range strike capability, enhanced surveillance using drones, missile defense, for example. So industrial cooperation needs to be on the table.
I regret that the French president was unable to honor the deal that had been negotiated between the French and Germans on FCAS [a flagship Franco-German next-generation fighter jet program.]
Are you saying this is his failure?
It is a failure of Franco-German cooperation, but it is first and foremost a personal failure for the president.
But you were against this program?
From the start, we said we needed to encourage the best-athlete policy. I am in favor of industrial cooperation, but to be free, we must first buy European equipment and buy French equipment.
The message I wish to convey to all our European partners is to buy [French] Rafales rather than [American] F-35s, so you exempt yourselves from the extraterritoriality of U.S., effectively placing in the hands of our transatlantic partners the ability to stop these planes from taking off.
It’s very expensive to develop these sixth-generation aircraft. How do you approach this going forward, if you say we’re staying 100 percent French on the aircraft of the future, but we also have German competition?
We need to support French industry. We need to start by removing all constraints and tax and regulatory barriers currently weighing on the French industry. We must fight in Europe for European preference. Now, you’re right, we need resources, and we need investment.
Let’s get back to Ukraine — you mentioned that many French presidential candidates are visiting Ukraine today.
For them, it’s just a show.
You’re making fun of them a bit. You don’t plan to go there?
Perhaps I’ll have the opportunity to go if we’re in power, but Ukraine is a theater of war. It’s not a stage for political posturing. When you see [centrist presidential candidate] Edouard Philippe getting off the train with his pajamas and moccasins in a war zone, I don’t think that’s very serious.
What about French troops in Ukraine after a ceasefire?
No, we are opposed.
Even after a ceasefire as part of a peace and security guarantee agreement?
The only way we would agree to send soldiers would be as United Nations peacekeepers following a ceasefire agreement.
How would you define the transatlantic relationship today?
The Americans are allies, and they will remain so, but they no longer intend to come to Europe’s rescue or to remain the protector of European countries.
How do you view U.S. President Donald Trump’s attitude today?
It depends on the day. There’s a Monday attitude, a Tuesday attitude, a Wednesday attitude. His positioning is not only erratic, but also extremely unsteady and constantly shifting.
If Trump calls you to offer his endorsement, what would you say?
I don’t need his support. The support I’m seeking, and the support we’re seeking with Marine Le Pen, is the support of the French people, the support of French voters.
You had expressed a certain admiration for him, though. Do you see him differently today?
I find that President Trump’s second term is very different from his first. His first term was defined by a desire to withdraw America from major global conflicts and to defend America First — that is, to prioritize American interests first in terms of the economy, identity and the defense of certain values.
President Trump’s second term is based on this U.S. Security Strategy that foreshadows this revival of the Monroe Doctrine, which holds that the United States is no longer a nation but is once again becoming an empire with exclusive influence over the Western Hemisphere.
Is Trump’s second term more dangerous or more threatening?
It is harder to read. It is threatening to Europe in the sense that it impacts many European countries fearful of the United States of America’s disengagement.
The Trump administration also comments on current events in Europe. U.S. Vice President JD Vance commented on a murder in the United Kingdom, saying that the migrant invasion was responsible for this kind of atrocity.
The fact that there is a fear today that tomorrow Europe will no longer be Europe and France will no longer be France, is perhaps shared by the leaders of the U.S. administration, but it is also shared by many people across the world.
There are many countries in the world that are deeply in love with France and believe that the world is what it is today because France exists and because of what France contributes to it, through its beauty, its elegance, its values. There are many people in Europe who are extremely unhappy to see France weakened and submerged by massive immigration that profoundly changes its identity and its values.
You find that their diagnosis isn’t wrong?
The diagnosis is our own. I’m not going to tell you otherwise just because foreigners think the same thing.
One of the flagship measures you have defended many times is to cut France’s contribution to the European Union. The long-term budget is currently being negotiated, and many want to finalize it before the presidential election.
Just by chance.
Do you condemn that?
The idea is obviously to lock in the budget before a potential change in France. The European Union is again pursuing its profoundly anti-democratic policy and philosophy.
We need a new European architecture. The pace at which Europeans and the European Union are moving today no longer matches the pace of the world. What the European Union stands for — globalization, powerful open markets, uncontrolled immigration, economic decline, and excessive regulation — is profoundly outdated. The European Union is completely obsolete and, in its current form and scope, is no longer capable of addressing the major challenges our country will face.
We must change the way the European Union functions, and that is why tomorrow we want France to contribute less to a budget currently projected to increase at a delusional rate on the eve of the presidential election. It is a democratic scandal.
The next French executive, whoever it may be, must have a say.
In practical terms, how does that work? If you’re elected, do you go to Brussels, bang your fist on the table and say, no, we’re not going to pay?
The European Union is like a big co-op, and France has one of the largest apartments with some of the most spacious terraces and the most parking spaces. But France is no longer capable today of defending its interests on the European stage. We saw this with energy. Thanks to nuclear power, France should be able to benefit from the cheapest and most carbon-free electricity.
Germany allows its major industrial firms to benefit from electricity at 50 euros per megawatt-hour. Our hope for the future is that France too can benefit from electricity priced at 50 euros per megawatt-hour.
This does not mean we are leaving the European market. France will continue to export energy, but it will allow French families, French businesses and startups investing in artificial intelligence to benefit from abundant, carbon-free electricity that is among the cheapest in Europe.
I’m sorry, I digressed a bit. On the budget, we will negotiate as Germany did and as the Netherlands did.
But those are a posteriori adjustments
We’ll go see the president of the European Commission and we’ll tell her that France will lower its contribution because we’re asking everyone to make sacrifices.
The French are being asked to make savings in times of crisis. But we’re telling them that the European Union’s budget is increasing 80 percent, that we’re raising the European commissioners’ private jet budget by 50 percent? Don’t you think that’s shocking? Don’t you think that outrages millions of French people?
[The EU says the proposed annual EU budget for 2028-34 is a nominal 38 percent higher than the one covering the previous seven years. POLITICO reported in February that the EU would spend as much as €16 million over the next four years on private jet travel, an increase of €3 million from the previous four-year period and 50 percent higher than the period before that.]
There are 27 countries that have to agree — it’s very complicated. The Commission could say OK, France stops paying, we’ll reduce French returns and freeze CAP subsidies. What would you say to the farmers?
It doesn’t work that way. France’s net contribution to the European Union budget is voted on by parliament. Instead of voting for a contribution to the European Union budget of 12 or 15 billion euros, it will be cut in half. And it’s this money that we’re going to get back.
When we tell French farmers, you’re getting money from Europe, that’s false. That money is France’s money, since France — unlike other European countries — contributes more to the European budget than it receives.
Last question, and it’s more lighthearted. Who is your favorite Italian woman: Maria Carolina de Bourbon des Deux-Siciles [Bardella’s girlfriend, an Italian princess and influencer] or Giorgia Meloni?
Maria Carolina.
And when it comes to politics?
I like Giorgia Meloni a lot. She’s a political leader who knew how to give Italy a fresh start, restore stability to a country that had never known such a stable government since the end of World War II, and who knew how to assert herself and establish new leadership for her country on the European stage.
Could you go on an official trip with her soon?
With Giorgia Meloni? [laughs]
Listen, she [de Bourbon] doesn’t do politics. Now, she is by my side, and she is an extraordinary woman. I am extremely happy and extremely in love. Now will she accompany me on political trips? I don’t know.